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Helen Irving*
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$99.00. Paperback. $32.99.
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW (Alfred A.
Knopf 2010). Pp. 288. Hardcover. $26.95.
Like many American products, constitutional originalism is iconically American
and attracts an international audience. It is familiar to constitutional scholars in every
country with a written constitution and probably a good number elsewhere. Originalism
is said to be compelling, the real thing, but why - what makes it so - is another matter.
The routine answer is that adherence to original meaning prevents judges from
substituting their personal values for, or sneaking political agendas into, judicial
conclusions: it is a curative for judicial activism. However, this response is mostly self-
affirming: originalism is good, because judicial activism is bad. The Constitution,
originalists tell us, belongs to "We, the people": it is wrong to depart from the people's
original understanding about what was promised and what was agreed. But why?
Gary McDowell's The Language of Law and the Foundations of American
Constitutionalism proffers a new(ish) answer. It is long and intricate - a summa, it
seems, of his previous writings - and it requires some patience. McDowell opens with
the well-worn propositions about originalism and judicial activism; however, his
conviction that the latter is evil reaches unusual heights. The adherents of original
meaning, McDowell writes, are engaged in no less than a "contemporary war for the
Constitution"' which they must win at the country's peril. The war was brewing for a
long time, but its "first great battle" 2 can be dated precisely. On October 23, 1987, the
Senate voted down President Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork to the
United States Supreme Court. Bork, McDowell writes, was incontestably qualified to sit
on the Court; his "legal abilities, and personal integrity were never in question." 3 It was
his originalism - his commitment to deriving constitutional meaning from the framers'
words, and his eschewal of unenumerated, non-textual rights - that sounded the death-
knell for his higher judicial prospects. Driven by methodological hostility, the Senate
* Reviewed by Helen Irving, Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Sydney.
1. GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 7 (2010).
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"concluded one of the most tumultuous battles in the history of the republic" and
committed an "unforgivable political and constitutional sin."4
This is heady stuff for your average constitutional scholar. With a narrative that
flips between invective and deep theory, almost post-modernist in its refusal to adopt a
detached, non-authorial voice, McDowell tells us just what is at stake: a choice between
stability and two equally terrible alternatives: anarchy or tyranny. Constitutional
originalism will guarantee the first; "living" constitutionalism will deliver the others. The
seeds of the Senate's sin lie in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the work
of three radical scholars: Christopher Columbus Langdell, appointed Dean of Harvard
Law School in 1870; Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton in the first decade of the
twentieth century; and Edward S. Corwin, recruited by Wilson in 1905. Together, these
men achieved a profound epistemological shift, a "new understanding of constitutional
interpretation as moral theory." 5 Breaking from the established Newtonian science of
static rules to embrace a social Darwinian science of evolution, they severed
constitutional meaning from legal principles or rules. The scholars' core strategy was to
postulate a higher, natural law, discernable only to initiates and yet adaptable to changing
circumstances and modern standards.
The revolution, we learn, kicked off with Langdell's pedagogical decision to
replace legal treatises with the case method at Harvard Law School, his appointment of
the first non-practitioner faculty member, James Barr Ames, and his establishment of the
Harvard Law Review. Wilson (supported by a "chorus" of "luminaries" like Oliver
Wendell Holmes)6 played his part by promoting the new constitutional science and
appointing Corwin, who systematized the idea of "higher-law" in his writings, thus
"cultivat[ing] the then-fallow field of constitutional law understood in light of political
theory."7 Judges quickly embraced the idea. Freed from the strictures of legal treatises,
they confused their own moral values with service to the higher law. As theory
triumphed, judge-made norms displaced rules and principles, and a common law
approach to constitutional meaning was incubated. The monster hatched. After a trial run
in the Lochner era, the Warren Court struck down laws on no firmer grounds than its
own findings that the Constitution protected "higher," unwritten rights, such as privacy.
Bork was purged because he resisted the revolution. "To an extraordinary degree,"
McDowell writes, this malign approach "continues to inform and shape much of
contemporary constitutional scholarship." 8
As we know from Louis Menand's sublime The Metaphysical Club,9 evolutionary
understandings were winning battles with pre-Darwinian notions all over the American
East in the second part of the nineteenth century. Static taxonomies were displaced in
disciplines such as history and philosophy, as well as the natural sciences. This part of
McDowell's book might be read as a companion perspective on a contemporaneous
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 11.
6. McDOWELL, supra note 1, at 40.
7. Id. at 41.
8. Id. at 53.
9. Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
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trend, albeit an ill-tempered one, whose characters pour "pedagogic salt"'0 into unhealed
wounds, insinuate "corrosive" and "destructive"" doctrines into settled understandings,
and commit "egregious" errors.12 (How, one wonders, did they get away with it?) Still, it
is interesting and fun in its splenetic way, and it tells us more about American legal
history than most other accounts of the evils of counter-originalism. However, does it
throw new light on the case for originalism? There is more.
The case, it turns out, has its origins in the early seventeenth century. Thomas
Hobbes is the unlikely hero. Hobbes's theory of the sovereign Leviathan, McDowell tells
us, trounced the medieval scholasticism that dominated his era. Hobbes rejected notions
of "higher law" (natural or theological) and promoted in their place a "sovereignty by
institution," a social contract which recorded the people's consent.' 3 No other authority
subsists, Hobbes concluded; no other source of power is legitimate. Language - the
keyword in the title of McDowell's book - now plays its critical role. Language serves as
both the form and the vehicle. Spoken intentions, Hobbes recognized, were transcribed
into written instruments. Language, thus, offered a sure, accessible, and proto-democratic
alternative to the mystifying hermeneuties of the Aristotelian schoolmen (those crafty
servants of the Pope!). More famously, Hobbes recognized that human beings need
institutions of governance; in their absence, life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short."' 4
These propositions, as McDowell explains them, are interwoven: institutions are
created by people who record their agreement in words; government is a reflection of
their spoken/written "contract." John Locke now takes up the baton. Locke's theories,
despite his disclaimers, reveal a continuity with Hobbes's (as happens with many of
McDowell's favorites, the differences turn out to be more apparent than real). Locke's
innovation was to distinguish the sovereign from the government, and affirm the right of
the sovereign people to withdraw their consent and institute new government. Locke,
thus, supplements Hobbes's "sovereignty by institution" with a "commonwealth by
constitution."' 5 Again, the central motor is language, agreements captured in words.
Locke's ideas took hold and influenced the framers of the United States Constitution.
Even the greatest advocates of the common law (William Blackstone and his American
followers, Chief Justice Marshall, Joseph Story, and others) shared a commitment to the
written record as the only clear guide to the terms agreed by the people. They too
understood the terrible alternatives to rule-bound institutions of governance. McDowell,
thus, assembles an army of unimpeachable jurisprudential warriors, led by Hobbes.
Facing them are the proponents of "living" constitutionalism, the descendents of
Langdell, the liberal, judicial activists, whose triumph (pro tem) stands for the very
tyranny against which Hobbes and his followers warned. McDowell now makes another
move - one often overlooked by defenders of originalism - explaining not only why
originalism is normatively desirable, but how judges should go about doing it. This is
10. McDOWELL, supra note 1, at 28.
11. Id. at 52.
12. Id. at 47.
13. Id. at 150-55.
14. Id. at 72.
15. MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 155-62.
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helpful. If original meaning is to be binding, we need to know how to decipher what was
meant by the people (now dead) who originally uttered the words. McDowell's answer,
an extended version of Antonin Scalia's, in A Matter of Interpretation,16 is that the
meaning captured in the text is discernible via principles of statutory interpretation.
These principles are rule bound, declarative, and unambiguous. The rules are found in
the common law canons, which, despite their unwritteness, are actually written: in the
treatises that Langdell abjured. Marbury v. Madison17 stands as the anchor point, where
constitutional interpretation is affixed to statutory interpretation. Marbury affirms not
only the power of judicial review, but expresses what Marshall later called "the most
sacred rule of interpretation": it is "the great duty of a judge who construes an instrument
... to find the intention of its makers."18
There is much to be said for the recognition of human beings as institutional,
thriving best under organized government and flourishing in the balance between rule-
based stability and ordered opportunities for rule changing. The idea (which, it might be
thought, derives less from Hobbes than from Rousseau 1 9) that "the people" are both
constituted by and through the act of creating their own institutions has received recent
attention, in particular in European and British constitutional scholarship. 20 However, it
is another thing for McDowell to find institutional stability in written constitutions alone
(as his logic, despite disclaimers, suggests). It is still another to imply that the multitude
of government functions that go on every day without recourse to constitutional rules, in
countries with or without written constitutions, are akin to trucks loaded with nitro-
glycerin, stable only so long as they do not meet a bump in the road. The ordinary
functioning of American government belies this. The experience of countries like
Britain, without a single constitutional instrument, or Australia, with relatively few
constitutional constraints, belies this. Arguably, judicial review keeps governments on
track at critical times - although the scope of Marbury remained unsettled and judicial
invalidation of laws was rare for much of the nineteenth century without disastrous
results - but it can also flick the off-switch on functioning government, if judges
(including those motivated by originalism), see their role as paramount rather than part
of a cooperative venture.
This is the message in Stephen Breyer's Making our Democracy Work: A Judge's
16. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). Scalia,
however, is scarcely acknowledged by McDowell. There may be a reason. Scalia, it turns out, does not
consistently follow through. In the Court, McDowell writes, "[t]he weight of ... precedents is such that even
he tends to acquiesce in their lingering legitimacy as a matter of binding constitutional law." Gary L.
McDowell, The Perverse Paradox ofPrivacy, in "A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE" THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON
AMERICAN VALUES 57, 81 (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005). If even a dedicated textualist like Scalia must throw in
the towel at times, surely the goal of methodological purity, upon which McDowell insists, is questionable.
17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
18. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167-69 (Gerald Gunther ed.,1969),
quoted in MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 2.
19. "[T]o find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person
and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone,
and remain as free as before. . . . is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would
make them vain and ineffective." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES
190-91 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman's Library rev. ed. 1993).
20. E.g., THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM
(Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
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View. 21 Breyer's book is a primer with a purpose: it is intended for a public audience,
introducing the varied and complex work of the Supreme Court, while providing a
normative guide to the theory and methodology of pragmatism. Breyer defends
pragmatism as delivering flexible constitutional outcomes in varying practical
circumstances; however, his pragmatism is not unprincipled. It is anchored to a
constellation of "unwavering values" 22: a commitment to liberty and to its bulwark,
democratic government. Breyer illustrates these principles with the stories of several
celebrated cases and an appendix of visual images to show that real human beings were
involved (no villains lurk in this gentle account). Context, Breyer stresses, is at the heart
of finding and applying constitutional purpose to factual circumstances.
The intention to demystify is appealing. For all this, and despite his focus on
constitutional law, Breyer's chapter on administrative agencies and the interpretation of
statutes that govern them is a paradoxical highlight. It serves to illustrate both the under-
recognized, non-constitutional role played by the Court, and also the logic of judicial
deference towards non-judicial actors, often better placed to understand the practical
operation of the law. Furthermore, it illustrates something Breyer himself may not have
intended: that there is a lot more to law than the protection of rights.
The purpose of law or, indeed, of constitutions, need not be exclusively the
restraint of government. Governments can be affirmative; they can act, as they often
have in history, as agents of human advancement and collective flourishing. Respect for,
rather than suspicion of government, infuses Breyer's account, but still his stories are
overwhelmingly about judicial responses to rights-denying laws. Perhaps the book's
purpose of explaining judicial review compels this, but it sits at odds with the theme of
balancing judicial supremacy with the working of good government. From this sweetly,
if subtly, unbalanced narrative emerges a picture of a judge who is half-hearted about the
courts.
Indeed, Breyer's perspective on judicial review is compatible with what Mark
Tushnet has labeled "weak-form."23 Weak-form review is found in constitutions (or
superstatutes) that allow the legislatures to pass laws "notwithstanding" their conflict
with protected rights (as under the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms24), or
deny courts the power of full judicial invalidation, but permit them to make "declarations
of incompatibility" between challenged laws and protected rights (as in the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act 199825). Declarations, specifically, are invitations to
governments to respond, to say whether or not they intend to correct the law, and why.
The process is said to rest on dialogue between the arms of government, rather than
single department supremacy. Dialogic judicial review has its critics (I, for one, question
whether it delivers the judicial restraint and inter-departmental cooperation that its
proponents claim), but it offers, for some, a half-way house between heavy-handed
21. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW (2010).
22. Id. at 75.
23. Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms ofJudicial Review, 101 MICH. L REv. 2781 (2003). Breyer notes that
Canada, Britain, and New Zealand have courts that lack "the power to patrol constitutional boundaries," but
offers no perspective on them. BREYER, supra note 21, at 3.
24. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
25. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (UK).
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judicial review and none at all. Moreover, for its critics, it is at least a means of
continuing the debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, tout court.
To a non-American (albeit in a country whose Constitution was significantly
copied from the American), the unending debates over originalism and the turbulence
and passion that surround it are both enthralling and revealing. Scholar after scholar
steps up to defend their favorite, seeking converts, and hoping to bring the debate to a
conclusion. But, as with the Sorcerer's Apprentice, the harder they try, the more the
broom multiplies. Why does it matter so much? What is at stake? We have seen
McDowell's response: it is the very fate of the nation. But, despite the methodological
war that McDowell sees raging in the United States, the absence of anarchy or tyranny
(at least in any meaningful sense) suggests this cannot be the only answer. Surely, what
one seeks is a methodology that will work not only in those happy times when one's
value-friends are on the bench, but also in those inevitable slumps - sometimes
depressingly long - when one's opponents hold office. McDowell wants to tie the hands
of friends and enemies alike, outsourcing constitutional meaning to a historically distant
provider (dialogue - an open-ended, rule-avoiding, inconclusive process - would be
anathema, one assumes 26). Breyer wants to free the hands but keep the hearts attached to
a set of enduring values.
What happens, then, when the Court reaches a conclusion that both originalists and
liberal pragmatists find abhorrent? Both McDowell and Breyer consider at length the
notorious 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sanford.27 Each, unsurprisingly, finds Chief Justice
Taney's reasoning to be wrong and prefers Justice Curtis's famous dissent. Each explains
Taney's conclusion that African Americans could not be constitutional "citizens" in a
revealingly tendentious way. For McDowell, Taney "helped to lay the foundation for the
rise of. . . government by judiciary,"28 attaching a new and ultimately influential
meaning to "due process" - one which connected it to the idea of implied constitutional
protection of property, and "embolden[ed] the judges to give voice to their personal
views of justice, which they could then present" as constitutional requirements. 29 Taney,
in other words, was not an originalist. For Breyer, Taney gave literal meaning to the
Constitution's words in the misguided attempt, perhaps, to settle a festering political
issue. He neither recognized an alternative historical context for the Constitution's
words, nor accepted that a workable, but decent conclusion was available. Taney, in
other words, was - or at least pretended to be - a semantic originalist. Breyer also
shares McDowell's regard for Marbury v. Madison,30 albeit as a pragmatic tour deforce
and an affirmation that the "'courts, as well as other departments, are bound by' the
Constitution."3 1
What, if anything, does this divergence from a common normative starting block
26. McDowell's definition of judicial review as "the power by which the federal courts declare legislative
acts unconstitutional" suggests as much. MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 311. Even the "review" side of the
business seems eclipsed in this jurisprudential Weltanschauung (doesn't "judicial review" involve the courts'
considering whether an act is unconstitutional?).
27. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
28. MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 384.
29. Id. at 385.
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
31. BREYER, supra note 21, at 21.
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reveal? If nothing else, it reveals that interpretive methodologies are not predictors of
norms, and norms are not predictors of interpretive conclusions. Try as we might,
certainty eludes our grasp and slips from our fingers. Jurists who promise certainty risk
the disillusionment of the public. Breyer understands this. Keeping the public's
confidence is central to his project. Making the public fearful seems to drive McDowell's
account.
If McDowell and Breyer, for opposing reasons, share an anxiety that judges will
assume a role subversive of government, neither notices a reason that such a takeover
might be possible. Their books, whether consciously or not, record the triumph of the
constitutional rights paradigm and, with it, judicial review inevitablism. Constitutions, it
is assumed, are analytically rights-protecting. Their institution-building, power-
distributing function (which, it might be noted, was the United States paradigm until the
twentieth century, as the ratio of federalism to rights cases reveals) is considered to be
secondary. With some rare exceptions (Australia, for example, the stand-alone in the
common law world with no bill or superstatute of rights, valiantly resisting both the
pressure and the opprobrium) national constitutions and international conventions are
configured as instruments of rights. It may shock American readers, but in practice,
rights and freedoms only rarely depend on legal enforcement or even the threat of it, and
it may surprise (I won't say shock) Justice Breyer that his book, paradoxically, is an
affirmation of this reality.
However, with the triumph of the constitutional rights paradigm comes the triumph
ofjudicial review. Notwithstanding a few lone scholars like Jeremy Waldron32 and Mark
Tushnet,33 who give more than a nod at the memory of Alexander Bickel, debate over
the democratic legitimacy of judicial review seems all but settled in the United States, as
it will become, indeed, in other countries, when their bills of rights dig in. The search for
ways to attenuate its effects, easing the disquiet some feel, by offering the choice of
weak-form review, or an "uneasy case" in its defense,34 only illustrates the
epistemological triumph. Here, debates about methods of constitutional interpretation
take their place. If judicial review is a fact of constitutional life, then arguing about the
method (or, at best, about who should do it35 ) becomes critical. Originalism offers itself
as the keep: "The only way the inherently undemocratic power of judicial review can be
reconciled with the demands of republican government is by keeping it tied to the written
text of the fundamental law," writes McDowell.36 But, like that other American
innovation, the pre-nup, originalism anticipates only what will happen in the event of a
break-up, and makes no allowance for the shared capacity building (not to mention love)
for which a marriage is designed. Breyer, in contrast, wants to make the marriage work.
Breyer appeals to the American public, for whom, one imagines, the promise of
32. E.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
33. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Mark Tushnet,
How Diferent are Waldron's and Fallon's Core Cases For and Against Judicial Review?, 30 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 49 (2010).
34. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARVARD L. REv. 1693
(2008) (arguing that the justification for judicial review lies in the responsibility of courts to safeguard
fundamental rights).
35. Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886 (2008).
36. MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 6.
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originalism and strong judicial review is more likely to be tempting than the
uncertainties of pragmatism. He calls to them with reason, though much rests on the thin
reed of his own dissents; but - as he asks himself - will they come? On the other
hand, will an American audience really be outraged by the story of juristic treason and
the case method, and aroused by a glimpse of the army led by Hobbes and his
footsoldiers bearing copies of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England and
Dwarris on Statutes?
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